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Abstract
Crime and Uncertain Punishment
We consider agents in a country in an early stage of transition from a planned to
a market economy. As the transition is in progress, the nature of the government’s
policies are unknown to the agents. Property rights once held by the state have
already been transferred to the agents, with each agent owning one firm. However,
the agents are uncertain of the level of law enforcement the government will provide.
Specifically, they are unsure of the tax and confiscation consequences of both legal and
illegal acts. Each agent, having a different cost of stealing, must decide how much
of the firm to divert to himself. The agents believe the government may become
either a traditional democratic government that supplies law enforcement as well as
infrastructure leading to positive firm growth, or a corrupt government that may or
may not provide law enforcement, does not provide a climate for firm growth, and
may be confiscatory. All agents presume the government will choose its behavior as
a function of the tax revenue it will collect under each scenario; however, the tax
revenue results from the collective decisions of the agents. This interaction between
tax revenue and agents’ decisions, together with the uncertainty of law enforcement
and tax policy, forms the framework within which the agent chooses his level of
honesty. By calculating the percentage of agents who steal some amount from the
firm, we investigate the relationship between the level of criminality and the various
uncertainties facing the agents. We show how expectations of the agents about the
future behavior of their government induce the degree of criminality in society.
JEL Classifications: K42, P14, P26
Key Words: Crime, rule of law, transition, economies in transition, law enforce-
ment, corruption
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1. Introduction
Consider an agent in a country in an early stage of transition from a planned to a
market economy. Suppose the transfer of property rights, once held by the state, has
already occurred. However, the transition is still in progress, and the nature of the
government’s policies are unknown to the agent. We have in mind that the agent is
uncertain as to the level of law enforcement that the government will provide. More
precisely, we assume the agent is uncertain as to the tax and confiscation consequences
of both legal and illegal actions in which he might partake. For simplicity, we let
each agent own one firm, and define an illegal action as the diversion of funds from
this firm into the agent’s pocket. Each agent must decide how much to steal. In
contemplating this decision, we assume that the agent believes that the government
can be one of two types: it can be a traditional democratic government that supplies
law enforcement as well as infrastructure leading to positive firm growth, or it can be
a corrupt government that may or may not provide law enforcement, that does not
provide a climate for firm growth, and may be confiscatory in its behavior. Given
this uncertainty as to government type, the agent presumes that the government will
choose its behavior as a function of the tax revenue it will collect under each scenario.
However, the tax revenue is a result of the collective decisions of the agents. This
interaction between tax revenue and agents’ decisions, together with the uncertainty of
law enforcement and tax policy, forms the framework within which the agent chooses
his level of honesty. By calculating the percentage of agents who will steal some
amount from the firm, we investigate the relationship between the level of criminality
and the various uncertainties facing the agents.
In our work, we are able to show how the expectations of the agents about the
future behavior of their government induces the degree of criminality in society. This
inclusion of the agents’ uncertainty regarding the form of government that will evolve
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is novel. Models of the rule of law in transition economies, for example, Hoff and
Stiglitz (2004), Polishchuk and Savvateev (2004) and Sonin (2003), contain agents
making their decisions without regard to the form of government that can ensue. In
these papers, the governmental form follows passively from the level of crime in the
society. A government that interacts with agents who must decide whether or not
to steal is studied in Katz and Owen (2005), but the form of government is fixed
and known to the agents. Grossman (1995) and Alexeev, Janeba and Osborne (2004)
both consider "mafias" that are independent of the government and compete with the
state for entrepreneurial rents in a setting where the form of the government is again
fixed and known to the agents. The same is true of Dixit (2004), which suggests a
principal-agent model to capture the intent of a government to induce efficiency in
society. Besides adding to the literature on the evolving rule of law in economies in
transition, we also contribute to the literature on the role of institutions in transition
(for example, Djankov and Murrell (2002), McMillan (2002) and Bevan and Estrin
(2004)), and to that stressing, more generally, that different economic outcomes are
to be expected from different institutional arrangements (for example, Shleifer and
Vishny (1998) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002, 2003)). We are
able to show that levels of crime increase with the agents’ uncertainty as to the form
that the government will take, and we do this by endogenizing the decision to commit
a crime with the uncertainty of the future form of government.
We present our model in Section 2 and derive its properties. In Section 3, some
further implications of the model are investigated through examples. Section 4 con-
tains a discussion of our results and concluding remarks.
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2. The Model
We consider a transition economy with a government and a continuum of risk neutral,
von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximizing agents. We imagine that the
agents must decide the degree to which they wish to be law abiding. The difficulty
for the agents in making this decision hinges on the fact that the government has not
completely chosen its type. We limit its type to one of two possibilities: a traditional
democratic government that supplies law enforcement as well as infrastructure, lead-
ing to positive firm growth (G1), or alternatively, a corrupt government about which
the agents are uncertain as to the degree of law enforcement, as well as the degree of
confiscatory behavior, and in which firms do not grow (G2).
Each agent characterizes G1 as follows. G1 strictly enforces the rule of law and
supplies a transparent fiscal policy. In G1, criminals are caught and punished, and
the promised tax structure, which differentiates between honestly earned funds and
stolen funds, is realized. That is, the tax on honestly earned funds is t, t ∈ [0, 1].
Illicit acts are caught and illicit funds are taxed at the punitive rate t + δ, where
t+ δ ∈ [0, 1]. In addition, all agents believe that in G1, firms will grow at the rate r,
r > 0. Each agent characterizes G2 as follows. G2 does not strictly enforce the rule
of law and its fiscal policy is unclear. In G2, criminals may be caught, property may
be confiscated and the tax structure may become draconian. An illicit act is detected
with probability λ, λ ∈ [0, 1] and, when detected, all of the agent’s funds are taxed
at the confiscatory rate of b, b ∈ [0, 1]. If illicit acts are not detected, then the illicit
funds are kept by the agent, and the honestly earned funds are taxed at a rate t with
probability p, p ∈ [0, 1], or at a rate t+∆, t+∆ ∈ [0, 1], otherwise. All agents believe
that in G2, firms will not grow at all.
We assume each agent has already acquired property rights over a firm, whose
value at the outset is normalized to one. The agent’s problem is to decide whether to
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steal from his firm, that is, what proportion τ , τ ∈ [0, 1], of the firm’s value to divert
to himself. Should the agent elect to steal τ , he incurs expenses cτ2
2
. Agents differ
only by the parameter c.We assume that the continuum of agents is characterized by
the continuous distribution H(c), where H(c) is strictly increasing on c ∈ [0, 1] with
density h(t). The agent’s decision about how law abiding to be is made independently
by each agent at time 1, with all agents sharing the same information. At time 2, the
government makes its choice, and all uncertainty is resolved.
One more bit of information is needed by the agents to enable them to formu-
late their decisions. This information is the probability with which the government
chooses to be either type G1 or G2. We endogenize this probability as follows. Since
governments need revenue to function, we assume that the agents believe that the
probability that the government will choose a particular type depends on the rev-
enue that that type will produce. Government revenue depends on fiscal policy, and
fiscal policy has an impact on each agent’s decision. Collectively, the agents’ deci-
sions determine the government’s tax revenue. Thus, in our model, the probability π,
π ∈ [0, 1], that the government type will be G1, is determined endogenously as agents
equate π to the proportion of revenue generated by G1, this revenue, in turn, being
a function of π.
We wish to establish the level of criminality in the society that results from the
agents’ uncertainty regarding the government’s choice of type, together with the un-
certainties inherent in G2. We begin by deriving the optimal decision for each agent
under the assumption that all of the information described above, including π, is
known to each agent. Referring to a particular agent by his cost parameter c, agent
c’s decision can be summarized by the following decision tree. The end-branch values
are given by A= (1−t)(1+r)−δτ(1+r)− cτ2
2
, B= 1−b− cτ2
2
, C= τ+(1−τ)(1−t)− cτ2
2
,
D = τ + (1− τ)(1− t−∆)− cτ2
2
.
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Figure 2.1:
Decision Tree
Our first proposition establishes τ ∗, the optimal proportion of the firm that agent
c chooses to appropriate. We define v(π) = (1 − λ)t − π[(1 − λ)t + δ(1 + r)] where
t = t+ (1− p)∆ is the expected tax rate under G2.
Proposition 1. Conditional on knowing all the parameters including π, agent cmax-
imizes his expected utility by choosing to appropriate τ ∗ percent of his firm, where
τ ∗ =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if v(π) ≥ c
v(π)
c if 0 < v(π) < c
0 if v(π) ≤ 0
.
Proof. See Appendix.
From P1, it follows that all agents would choose to be honest if v(π) ≤ 0. Ex-
amining v(π), we see that this condition would hold if πδ(1 + r) were larger than
(1− π)(1− λ)t. This inequality would occur if π, δ or r were large or if λ were large.
Thus, if agents believe the probability of G1 occurring is large, or perceive G1 as
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guaranteeing a heavy penalty for breaking the law or as producing a good environ-
ment, an honest society would follow. It would also follow if, in G2, there were a high
probability of catching law-breakers. Conversely, if π were small, some level of crime
would result. The condition that v(π) > 0 would hold if πδ(1 + r) were less than
(1 − π)(1 − λ)t, that is, if agents expected the economy of G1 to grow moderately,
or expected the punitive tax rate to be not too large. Since (1 − λ)t ≤ 1, it follows
that v(π) ≤ 1. So, unless both λ = 0 and t = 1, when v(π) > 0 there will be c
values below v(π) and the corresponding agents represent the proportion of agents
who steal heavily from their firms. Furthermore, there will be c values greater than
v(π) and the agents corresponding to these c values represent the proportion that
steal moderately from their firms. In any event, when v(π) > 0, crime will persist in
the society.
In P1, we assumed π was known to all agents. As described earlier, π has an
impact on the level of crime in society, and this level of crime has an impact on the
tax revenue collected by the government. Agents believe that the choice of government
type depends on the tax revenue that its choice would produce. Using this assumption,
we now move to endogenize π.
We define the tax revenue that G1 would receive for an arbitrary value of π and
for c = c, the average value of c, as R(G1 | π, c). Similarly, we define the tax revenue
to G2 as R(G2 | π, c). We let f(π) = R(G1|π,c)R(G1|π,c)+R(G2|π,c) represent the proportion of
revenue to G1 corresponding to the average agent c.
We assume that agents believe that the government will take tax revenue as the
basis of its choice of type, and that this tax revenue will be based on the government’s
perception of the average agent, c. In sum, we assume that agents will choose π to
satisfy π = f(π) corresponding to c = c. In the next proposition, we rewrite the result
of P1 corresponding to c = c and exhibit its dependency on π.
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Proposition 2. If c = c, then τ ∗c =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if 0 ≤ π ≤ π0
v(π)
c if π0 < π < π1
0 if π1 ≤ π ≤ 1
where π0 = max[0, (1−λ)t−c(1−λ)t+δ(1+r) ] and π1 = [
(1−λ)t
(1−λ)t+δ(1+r) ].
Proof. See Appendix.
If c > (1− λ)t, π0 = 0 and τ ∗c < 1 so that the average agent tends to be a smaller
thief. Although it is not surprising that large costs of stealing diminish large crime,
large costs do not eradicate crime since π1 is not affected by c. Note that eradicating
the uncertainty of being caught does not eradicate crime. If we remove the uncertainty
of being caught by setting λ = 1, then both π0 = 0 and π1 = 0, implying that τ ∗c = 0
and the average agent is honest. However, if alternatively, we remove the uncertainty
of being caught by setting λ = 0, even if c is large, π1 6= 0 and some crime could
persist, depending on the sizes of t, δ and r. Thus, the two sources of uncertainty
must be considered in determining the level of crime.
Since the government is assumed to be thinking in terms of the average agent, P2
represents the behavior of this agent to the government. This, in turn, permits the
agents to calculate the proportion of revenue that the government would be facing.
We next evaluate this proportional tax revenue, f(π).
Proposition 3. f(π) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1+r)(t+δ)
(1+r)(t+δ)+λb if 0 ≤ π ≤ π0
(1+r)(t+ v(π)c δ)
(1+r)(t+v(π)c δ)+λb+(1−λ)(1−
v(π)
c )t
if π0 < π < π1
(1+r)t
(1+r)t+λb+(1−λ)t if π1 ≤ π ≤ 1
.
Proof. See Appendix.
The agents assume that the proportional tax revenue, f(π), which depends on
their combined behavior, is the basis upon which the government will choose its type.
Thus, the agents will choose as the probability that the type chosen will be G1, the
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solution to the equation π = f(π).We next examine the properties of this endogenized
probability.
Proposition 4. π = f(π) has a unique solution π∗ for π ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition shows that there is only one probability that is consistent with
the agents’ beliefs concerning the government’s choice of type. We next locate π∗ in
terms of the parameters π0 and π1 given in P2.
Proposition 5. a. If π0 ≥ f(π0), then 0 ≤ π∗ ≤ π0.
b. If π1 ≥ f(π1) and π0 < f(π0), then π0 < π∗ < π1.
c. If π1 < f(π1), then π1 ≤ π∗ ≤ 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
We next connect the endogenized value π∗ to agent c’s choice. In what follows,
we let v∗ = v(π∗)
Proposition 6. a. If 0 ≤ π∗ ≤ π0, then v∗ > c and τ ∗ > 0 for all c.
b. If π0 < π∗ < π1, then 0 < v∗ < c and τ ∗ > 0 for all c.
c. If π∗ ≥ π1, then v∗ ≤ 0 and τ ∗ = 0 for all c.
Proof. See Appendix.
We can now establish a property of the collective behavior of all agents.
Proposition 7. a. If π1 < f(π1), then all agents choose to be honest.
b. If π1 ≥ f(π1), then all agents steal some amount from their firms.
Proof. See Appendix.
Based on the last proposition, we are led to define the level of crime, K(v∗ | γ),
which results from the collective decisions of the agents, as the proportion of agents
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who steal at least γ percent of their firms. Recall that c has distribution function
H(c).
Proposition 8. Let 0 < γ ≤ 1. Then
K(v∗ | γ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0 if v∗ < 0
H(v∗γ ) if 0 ≤ v∗ ≤ γ
1 if v∗ > γ
where v∗ = v(π∗).
Proof. See Appendix.
P8 establishes the relationship between the level of crime and both the collective
evaluation of the future government by all agents as well as the perceived evaluation
by the government of all the agents. We next proceed to consider how changes in
these evaluations effect the level of crime. Specifically, we investigate how K(v∗ | γ)
changes as specific parameters change. When focusing on a specific parameter θ, we
write K(v∗ | γ) as K(θ | γ).
Before proceeding, we note the following. When either of the cases v∗ < 0 or
v∗ > γ hold, K(θ | γ) is constant. Thus, infinitesimal changes in any parameter
θ will not change K(θ | γ). The remaining case, when 0 ≤ v∗ ≤ γ, needs closer
scrutiny. Here, K(θ | γ) = H(v∗γ ) which is a differentiable function of v∗ since H(c)
is continuous with density h(c). It follows that ∂K(θ|γ)∂θ =
1
γh(
v∗
γ )
∂v∗
∂θ . Thus, the sign of
∂K(θ|γ)
∂θ is the same as that of
∂v∗
∂θ . Note that the parameter θ = c cannot be handled
this way since a change in c causes a change in H(c) also. We handle the case of this
parameter by an example presented below.
Proposition 9. Let v∗ < c. Then the sign of ∂v∗∂θ is the same as the sign of g2θv∗
2 −
g1θv∗ + g0θ where giθ, i = 0, 1, 2, are the partial derivatives with respect to θ of g0 =
c(1−λ)t[λb+(1−λ)t]−cδt(1+r)2, g1 = (1+r)ct+c[λb+(1−λ)t]+(1−λ)2t2+δ2(1+r)2,
and g2 = (1− λ)t− δ(1 + r), respectively.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 10. Let 0 ≤ v∗ ≤ min(c, γ). Then
a. K(θ | γ) decreases as θ = r or δ increases.
b. K(θ | γ) increases as θ = b or t increases.
c. If (1− λ) ≤ ct [1−
b−t
t ], K(θ | γ) decreases as θ = λ increases.
Proof. See Appendix.
It is not surprising that the promise of an improvement in G1’s economy, i.e., an
increase in r, would cause more agents to wish to take advantage of this opportu-
nity. But, if these agents believe that G1 would prevail, then any thievery would be
punished. Thus, to take advantage of the improved economic climate, the amount
of thievery would have to be reduced. Similarly, an increase in the punitive rate δ
imposes a heavier cost on every thief in G1 since each thief will be caught. This, in
turn, will dissuade some from stealing and reduce the overall level of crime. Part b of
P10 yields an often noted result that links crime to corruption. If we interprete b as a
bribe that the government extracts from criminals wishing to avoid punishment, then
an increase in this type of corruption causes, rather than deters, an increase in crime.
Similarly, if G2 increases the tax rate t, an increase in the level of crime occurs. Part
c of P10 shows the complexity of the factors that can cause an increase or decrease in
the level of crime. In particular, the change in the level of crime due to a change in λ
cannot be predicted without imposing restrictions on other parameters. The interac-
tions between these parameters, as well as the non-linearities inherent in the model,
prevent simple predictions from being made. We illustrate this below by example. In
P10 we assumed that 0 ≤ v∗ ≤ min(c, γ). However, the case where c < v∗ ≤ γ can be
shown to yield similar results.
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3. Examples
In order to illustrate some additional features of the model and the level of crime
associated with the parameters, we start with the following set-up. In G1, honest
agents are taxed at t = .3, the infrastructure is improved so that firms will benefit,
i.e., r = .2, all thieves are caught, and all stolen funds are taxed (penalized) at
the additional rate δ = .2. By contrast, in G2, thieves are caught with probability
λ = .5. If caught, the government confiscates their wealth at the rate b = .6. If a
thief is not caught, he keeps what was stolen and the part of the firm not stolen
is taxed at the rate t = .3 only with probability p = .5. Otherwise, the tax rate is
increased by∆ = .4.There is no improvement of infrastructure assumed in this form of
government. Finally, we assume that the distribution of c is given byH(c) = c ∈ [0, 1],
implying that c = .5. Using P2, it follows that π0 = 0 and π1 = .5102. From P3,
f(π1) = .3956. Thus from P5, π∗ ∈ (0, π1). Since, from the proof of P9, v∗ satisfies
g2v∗
2 − g1v∗ + g0 = 0, we can solve this equation explicitly here. Solving, we have
π∗ = .4182 and v∗ = .0451. Based on the remarks following P8, the proportions
of agents stealing more than 15%, 25% and 50% of their firms are K(.15) = .30,
K(.25) = .18, and K(.50) = .09, respectively. When there are as many high cost
as low cost agents, moderate crime flourishes and there is a notable number of large
crimes.
Turning to comparative statics, we note that increasing r, δ, b or t results in an
unambiguous change in the proportion of agents who steal from their firms as seen
in P10. On the other hand, the impact of a change in λ is more complicated. We
now illustrate part c of P10. We increase the value of λ from .5 to.6. We must check
two conditions to illustrate part c. First, we must check whether π0 ≤ π∗ ≤ π1 for
λ = .6, and second, whether 1− .6 ≤ ct [1−
b−t
t ]. The second condition is easily verified
since the right-hand-side of the inequality equals .8. To check the first condition, we
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must resolve the problem for λ = .6. Solving, we have π∗ = .395, v∗ = .026, π0 = 0,
π1 = .455 and f(π1) = .39. The first condition is satisfied and we illustrate part c
by computing the levels of crime. It follows from v∗ = .026 that K(λ | .15) = .17,
K(λ | .25) = .10, and K(λ | .50) = .05. As predicted by P10, each of these is smaller
than their counterpart above.
Based on the remark before P9, c could not be included in P10 so we next present
an example that varies from the original illustration by changing the distribution of
c. Let H(c) = c2 for c ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, c = 2/3. Reworking the illustration (setting
λ = .5 again), we have π∗ = .4144 and v∗ = .0469. Here, the proportions of agents
stealing more than 15%, 25% and 50% of their firms are K(.15) = .10, K(.25) = .035,
and K(.50) = .009, respectively. Moderate crime is much lower and large crimes have
been substantially reduced.
We consider one final variation of our basic illustration that was not handled
by P10, that is, the change in the basic tax rate t shared by both governments.
Reworking our illustration after setting t = .5, we have π∗ = .5046 and v∗ = .0523.
Here, the proportions of agents stealing more than 15%, 25% and 50% of their firms
are K(.15) = .35, K(.25) = .21, and K(.50) = .10. Thus, the increase in the basic
tax rate by G1 causes the level of crime to rise.
4. Discussion and Conclusions
Our model was chosen to explore the impact of uncertainty on the level of crime.
Uncertainty entered in two ways. First, there was the uncertainty that G2 would
enforce the law, would raise taxes or become confiscatory. Though these choices
by G2 were not known to the agents, we did assume that the probability of their
occurrences were known. The second way that uncertainty entered was through the
probability that G1 or G2 would result. Thus, we set out to study how the agents
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would determine the probability π∗ that G1 would come into being as a result of the
other uncertainties in the problem.
We assumed that the agents in this society presumed that the government’s ul-
timate choice of type would be based on the level of tax revenues that these types
would generate. Since crime would alter these tax revenues, and the agents’ decisions
to steal had to be made before the government’s type was revealed, the probability
that the government would choose a particular type was made endogeneously.
Our first set of results established the way in which π∗ was calculated by the
agents. Having this value, each agent could decide whether to steal and how much
to steal. Collectively, a level of crime in society was established. We next showed
how π∗ and the level of crime would change as different parameter values changed.
Our aim was that the study of these changes would have in them the seeds of policy
choices.
Some of the changes we found are intuitive. For example, as the level of confisca-
tion increases (b), or the level of taxation increases (t), the level of crime increases. As
the average cost of stealing (c), or the penalty tax rate (δ) in G1 increases, the level
of crime decreases. However, a non-intuitive result also presented itself. One would
have expected that crime would decrease as the probability that illicit acts would be
caught (λ) increased in G2. However, the nonlinearities inherent in the solution for
π∗ in the range π0 < π∗ < π1 prevent such a conclusion from being unambiguously
drawn. This suggests that while some of the changes will have the anticipated effect,
others that seemed reasonable, may be misleading.
The government, though mentioned often in the previous pages, is not an active
participant in our model, and in fact only exists as a result of the assumption made
by the agents that the government’s choice of type depends on received tax revenues.
It is not difficult to imagine that the actual government might know its type already,
or that it has a criterion different than that assumed by the agents. Moreover, if
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the government knew the way the agents’ choices were made, it could use results
like those in P10 to try and influence the agents’ behavior for its own interests. In
this way, one can interprete P10 as having policy implications. (See Katz and Owen
(2005) where the government’s benefit function depends on the level of crime.) The
introduction of an active government into our model is being investigated.
5. Appendix
Proof of P1.
We first establish the expected revenue of agent c if he steals τ . From the text,
E(G1) = (1+ r)(1− t)− τδ(1+ r)− cτ2
2
. Also, E(G2) = 1−λb− (1−λ)(1− τ)t− cτ2
2
.
Finally, the expected revenue of agent c is πE(G1) + (1− π)E(G2) which after some
collection of terms becomes π(1 − t)(1 + r) + (1 − π)[1 − (λb + (1 − λ)t)] + τ [(1 −
π)(1− λ)t− πδ(1 + r)]− cτ2
2
. Maximizing this expression over τ for 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 yields
τ ∗ =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1 for v(π) ≥ c
v(π)
c for 0 < v(π) < c
0 for v(π) ≤ 0
,
where v(π) = (1− λ)t− π[(1− λ)t+ δ(1 + r)].♣
Proof of P2.
It follows from the definition of v(π) that v(π) ≥ c if 0 ≤ π ≤ (1−λ)t−c
(1−λ)t+δ(1+r) ,
0 < v(π) < c if (1−λ)t−c
(1−λ)t+δ(1+r) < π <
(1−λ)t
(1−λ)t+δ(1+r) , and v(π) ≤ 0 if
(1−λ)t
(1−λ)t+δ(1+r) ≤ π ≤ 1.
Thus, setting c = c, and using the same approach as in P1, we have
τ ∗ =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1 if 0 ≤ π ≤ π0
v(π)
c if π0 < π < π1
0 if π1 ≤ π ≤ 1
,
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where π0 = max[0, (1−λ)t−c(1−λ)t+δ(1+r) ] and π1 =
(1−λ)t
(1−λ)t+δ(1+r) .♣
Proof of P3.
The government’s expected revenue corresponds to the tax revenue that results
from the average agent’s optimum choices, i.e., τ ∗c . Thus, if c = c, R(G1 | π, c) =
(1 + r)(t + τ ∗cδ), i.e., the tax t on the final value of the firm plus the additional tax
on the stolen part of the firm. Also, R(G2 | π, c) = λb + (1 − λ)(1 − τ ∗c)t, i.e., the
government gets the bribe with probability λ and, with the remaining probability,
just taxes the part of the firm not stolen at the expected tax rate t. It follows that
f(π) = R(G1|π,c)R(G1|π,c)+R(G2|π,c) =
(1+r)(1+τ∗cδ)
(1+r)(1+τ∗cδ)+λb+(1−λ)(1−τ∗c)t
. Finally, substituting the proper
value of τ ∗ from P2 yields the result. ♣
Proof of P4.
Examination of f(π) in P3 shows that it is continuous and non-increasing for
0 ≤ π ≤ 1. Furthermore, by construction, 0 < f(π) < 1. Thus, the function π − f(π)
is a continuous, increasing function that is negative at π = 0 and positive at π = 1.
Thus, it crosses the axis at a single point, π∗.♣
Proof of P5.
Since f(π) is non-increasing and π is increasing, π∗ will be in [0, π0] if and only
if π0 ≥ f(π0). To be in (π0, π1), it is required that π0 < f(π0) and that π1 ≤ f(π1).
Finally, to be in [π1, 1], it is required that π1 ≤ f(π1).♣
Proof of P6.
Since v∗ − c = (1 − π∗)[(1 − λ)t − c] − π∗[δ(1 + r) + c], it is proportional to
(1− π∗)π0 − π∗(1− π0) = π0 − π∗ so v∗ > c > 0 and part a follows from P1. It also
follows that v∗ < c if π∗ > π0. Similarly, v∗ = (1− π∗)[(1− λ)t]− π∗[δ(1 + r)], which
is proportional to (1 − π∗)π1 − π∗(1 − π1) = π1 − π∗. Thus, v∗ > 0 if π∗ < π1 and
v∗ < 0 if π∗ > π1. Invoking P1 again completes the proof.♣
Proof of P7.
From P5, when π1 < f(π1), then π∗ ∈ [π1, 1]. Thus, v(π∗) = (1 − λ)t − π∗[(1 −
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λ)t+ δ(1+ r)] ≤ (1− λ)t− π1[(1− λ)t+ δ(1 + r) = 0. Evaluating P1 at v∗, it follows
that τ ∗ = 0 for all c. Therefore, part a follows.
To prove part b, we note that from P5, when π1 ≥ f(π1), v∗ is positive. Again,
from P1, we have that for every value of c, some fraction, if not all of the firm, will
be stolen.♣
Proof of P8.
Given π∗ and c, it follows from P1 that agent c will steal at least γ if v∗c ≥ γ. If
v∗ < 0, no agent would steal this amount so K(v∗ | γ) = 0. If 0 ≤ v∗ ≤ γ, then all
agents c will steal at least γ when c ≤ v∗γ . Given the definition of H(c), it follows
that the proportion of agents that will steal at least γ is H(v∗γ ). Finally, when v∗ > γ,
then every c value will satisfy v∗c ≥ γ and the result follows.♣
Proof of P9.
If v∗ < c, then from P3 it follows that π∗ satisfies π∗ = (1+r)(t+
v∗
c δ)
(1+r)(t+v∗c δ)+λb+(1−λ)(1−
v∗
c t)
.
Since v∗ = (1−λ)t−π∗[(1−λ)t+δ(1+r)], π∗ can be written as (1−λ)t−v
∗
(1−λ)t+δ(1+r) , making
the previous equation a function of v∗.Multiplying through by the denominator of the
right-hand-side and rearranging terms yields a quadratic equation in v∗, i.e., g2v∗
2 −
g1v∗ + g0, where the functions gi, i = 0, 1, 2, are given in the proposition. Implicit
differentiation shows that v∗θ = ∂v
∗
∂θ must satisfy (g1− 2g2v∗)v∗θ = g2θv∗
2 − g1θv∗ + g0θ.
It remains to show that g1 − 2g2v∗ > 0. Note
g1 − 2g2v∗ = (1 + r)ct+ c[λb+ (1− λ)t] + (1− λ)t2 +
δ2(1 + r)2 − 2v∗[(1− λ)t− δ(1 + r))]
≥ c(1− λ)t− v∗(1− λ)t+ (1− λ)t2 − v∗(1− λ)t
= (1− λ)t[c− v∗ + t− v∗].
It follows that g1 − 2g2v∗ > 0 since v∗ < (1 − λ)t ≤ t and v∗ < c, and the
proposition follows.♣
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Proof of P10.
Part a. Evaluating g2θv∗
2 − g1θv∗ + g0θ for θ = r yields −δv∗
2 − v∗[ct + 2δ2(1 +
r)]− 2cδt(1 + r) < 0. Similarly, evaluating this expression for θ = δ yields the same
sign.
Part b. When θ = b, the expression becomes v∗[cλ]+c(1−λ)tλ = cλ[(1−λ)t−v∗] >
0.
Now let θ = t. Evaluating g2θv∗
2−g1θv∗+g0θ for θ = t, yields v∗
2
(1−λ)−v∗[c(1−
λ) + 2(1− λ)2t] + c(1− λ)[λb+ (1− λ)t] + c(1− λ)2t
= (1− λ){v∗(v∗ − c)− 2(1− λ)t(v∗ − c) + cλb}
= (1− λ){(v∗ − c)[v∗ − 2(1− λ)t] + cλb} > 0 since v∗ < c and v∗ < 2(1− λ)t.
Part c. Evaluating g2θv∗
2 − g1θv∗+ g0θ for θ = λ yields −tv∗
2 − v∗[c(b− t)− 2(1−
λ)t2] + c(b− t)(1− λ)t− ct[λb+ (1− λ)t]
= tv∗[(1−λ)t−v∗]+c(b−t)[(1−λ)t−v∗]+(1−λ)t2v∗−ct[λb+(1−λ)t]. Remembering
that v∗ = (1−λ)t−π∗[(1−λ)t+δ(1+r)] and the definition of π1 given in P2, the sign
of the last expression is unchanged when we divide through by [(1−λ)t+δ(1+r)] and
it becomes tv∗π∗ + c(b− t)π∗ + [(1− λ)t2(π1 − π∗)− ctπ1 − ct(1−λ)t+δ(1+r) ]. Combining
terms we have tπ∗[v∗ − (1− λ)t] + c(b− t)π∗ + [(1− λ)t2 − ct]π1 − ct(1−λ)t+δ(1+r) . This
expression is non-positive if c(b−t)π∗+[(1−λ)t2−ct]π1 ≤ 0 or if (1−λ) ≤ ct [1−
π∗
π1
b−t
t ].
The last inequality would hold if (1− λ) ≤ ct [1−
b−t
t ].♣
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